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Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams*
I. NTRODUCTION
Employers need no longer worry that the arbitration agreements they include
in contracts of employment will be subject to attack) In Circuit City v. Adams,2
the Supreme Court definitively stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)3
covers binding arbitration clauses in employment contracts, even if the clauses
require arbitration of statutory claims.4
The FAA 5 was passed in 1925 to legitimize arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism and to compel parties who have entered into an arbitration agreement,
but who attempt to sue, to resolve their disputes through arbitration.6 To ensure
continuity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements, the FAA preempts state
laws hostile to arbitration.7
Until now, the precise scope of the FAA's coverage of employment contracts
was unknown because of the ambiguous language in the statute's section 1
exemption provision. This exemption provision delineates the types of contracts
that are not covered by the FAA, causing the arbitration provision within the
contract to be unenforceable. Before Circuit City, the debate over FAA coverage
of contracts of employment turned on the meaning of the phrase "engaged in
commerce" in section 1. Section 1 states, "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce.
' 8
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit,9 all federal circuit courts of appeals
that have interpreted the FAA's section 1 exemption language have held that it
exempts only employment contracts of workers actually engaged in the transport
*121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
1 See David G. Savage, Justice in Job Disputes: With Mandatory Arbitration Ok'd, the
Focus Shifts to Making Sure It's Fair, 87 A.B.A. J., May2001, at 30 (stating that employers are
now free to require arbitration of all employment claims).
2 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
3 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
4 Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1302
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
6 Holland & Hart, High Court Holds Worker to Signed Agreement, 6 Wyo. EMP. LAW
LETrER (M. Lee Smith Publishers LLC, Brentwood, Tenn.), June 2001, at 7.
7 Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1307.
8 9 U.S.C. § 1.
9 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
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of goods in interstate commerce.10 With its decision in Circuit City,'1 the
Supreme Court has finally interpreted the language in the section 1 exemption
provision of the FAA, a task it declined to do in its 1991 decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Corp.12 As a result of the Circuit City decision, the FAA
covers employment contracts of all workers other than transportation workers.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Saint Clair Adams applied for a job with Circuit City Stores, Inc. in October
1995.13 To be considered for employment, Adams was required to sign an
agreement to arbitrate all claims or disputes arising out of his employment.' 4 Two
years after his employment commenced, Adams filed an employment
discrimination suit in California state court.15 In turn, Circuit City filed suit in the
United States District Court in the Northern District of California to enjoin
Adams' state court action and to compel Adams to arbitrate the claim because of
the mandatory arbitration contract he signed as part of his employment
application.16 Circuit City relied on the fact that the FAA's intended purpose is to
provide judicial enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration agreements.
17
The United States District Court granted Circuit City's motion for injunctive
relief and its motion to compel Adams to arbitrate his employment discrimination
claim.' 8 Adams appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which decided that the FAA does not cover any contracts of employment.' 9
Circuit City appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari
on the issue of whether the FAA's section 1 exemption provision excludes all
employment contracts from the FAA's coverage.
20
10 See Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1306-07 (listing many of the appellate cases that have
concluded that employment contracts are not excluded from the coverage of the FAA).
I I Id. at 1302.
12 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991). The Court upheld
an arbitration provision in securities regulation literature that required arbitration of an ADEA
claim. The Court declined to interpret section 1 of the FAA because the arbitration provision at
issue was not in a contract of employment.




17 Id. at 1307.
18 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 1998).
19 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
20 Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1306-07.
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III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Supreme Court-held that the FAA's section 1 exemption provision
expressly exempts from FAA coverage only seamen, railroad employees, or
workers "actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce."21
Thus the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that all employment
contracts are exempt from FAA coverage.
The Court reached its holding by comparing the exemption language in
section 1 with the coverage language in section 2, by relying on the ejusdem
generis canon of statutory construction, and by acknowledging and deferring to
precedent.
A. Statutory Language Comparison of Section I and Section 2
The Court compared the language of section. 1 and section 2 to support its
holding. Section 2 of the FAA states that "a written provision in... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."2 2 The Court rejected Adams' argument that the section 1
exemption applies to all contracts of employment, because such reasoning would
make the exemption language in section 1 superfluous.2 3 The Court reasoned that
if all contracts of employment were exempt from the coverage of the FAA, then
there would be no need for the special exemption provision in section 1.24
B. Ejusdem Generis and Statutory Construction
To further support its holding, the Court relied on the ejusdem generis canon
of statutory construction.25 This doctrine provides that general words that follow
specific words should be construed to apply to objects similar to those in the
preceding specific words.26 Therefore, the general phrase "any other class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce" specifically refers only to seamen and
railroad or transportation workers, so the entire clause means that only contracts
21 Id. at 1307 (quoting Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
22 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
23 Circuit City, 121 S. CL at 1308.
24 Id
25 Id
26 Id. at 1308-09.
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of workers engaged in actual transport of goods in interstate commerce are
exempt from FAA coverage.
C. The Court's Reliance on Precedent
In devising its holding, the Court was conscious that acceptance of Adams'
interpretation of the FAA would be inconsistent with Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,27 in which the Court enforced an arbitration provision in securities
regulation literature based on the section 2 coverage language. The Court also
wanted to maintain a holding consistent with Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson,28 in which it broadly interpreted the meaning of the section 2 coverage
provision.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
What is noteworthy about the Circuit City decision is that the Supreme Court
finally expressly upheld a contract providing for the use of mandatory arbitration
for resolving statutory employment discrimination claims.29 The decision acts
almost as an express authorization for employers to include mandatory binding
arbitration provisions in their employment contracts.
In reality, the holding in Circuit City may be less than controversial for many
reasons. The decision does not alter the law as lower courts have interpreted it
since the Gilmer decision in 1991.30 In addition, the decision does not address
many key issues surrounding arbitration of statutory claims. Finally, while the
decision could benefit employers and harm employees, as many commentators
have suggested, there may not be any real practical effect from the decision.
Perhaps the greatest result from the decision may be found if congressional
response stems from it.
27 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Court held that the
section 2 coverage provision of the FAA required the arbitration of an age discrimination claim.
28 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court decided
that the section 2 words "involving commerce" represented Congress' intent to exercise it
commerce power in full. Id. at 277.
29 Circuit City, 121 S.Ct. at 1313.
30 Practitioners Dispute Viability of Arbitration Clauses After Randolph, Adams, 4
CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP. (LRP Publications, Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 30, 2001, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Combined Legal Newsletters File [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN.]; see also supra
note 12 and accompanying text [hereinafter CONSUMER FINANCIAL].
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A. Nhat the Ruling Does Not Address
The Circuit City Court did not address what types of procedural due process
safeguards are necessary for arbitration to fairly resolve statutory claims.31 The
Court did reiterate its statement from Gilmer that "by agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forego substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral not a judicial forum."32 This
statement does little to address the fact that there are no real standards of
education, experience, or qualification required to be an arbitrator.33
The Court also did not address whether there should be a mandatory period
of discovery before compulsory arbitration.3 4 This issue is particularly important
for employees because proving a statutory employment discrimination claim,
even in arbitration, could be impossible if the employee does not have the
opportunity to conduct discovery.35 If employers are not required to allow
discovery, then the employer may be able to dispose of the claim shortly after it is
brought
Similarly, the Court did not indicate who should bear the costs of the
arbitration.36 If the employer bears the entire cost, the arbitrator may be partial to
the employer.37 However, it may be substantially unfair for an employee to bear
the cost, because the employee most likely has less financial resources. It is
preferable that the employer and employee share the costs of the arbitration;
31 See H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for Retaining the Well Established Distinction
Between Contractual and Statutory Claims in Labor Arbitration, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1,
67 (1997) (stating that the Gilmer decision supported an expectation that arbitration must meet a
minimum of due process requirements to be appropriate for the resolution of statutory claims).
32 Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1313 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
33 Kathleen M. O'Connell, Employees Lose in 'Circuit City, N.Y. L.J., May 24, 2001,
at 2.
34 See Michael J. Connolly & Clifford J. Scharman, U.S. Supreme Court Gives Employers
a Chance to Avoid Costly Litigation, 16 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal
Foundation, Washington, D.C.), June 29,2001, at 2.
35 Jenifer A. Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: An Analysis of Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REv. 641,655 (1992).
36 Connolly & Scharman, supra note 34, at 2.
37 Ann C. Hodges, Dispute Resolution Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: A
Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1007,
1097-98 & n.463 (1996). The arbitrator may also be partial to the employer because it is more
likely, than an employee, to bring repeat business. Id. at 1097. But see Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. & ENDM. POL'Y J. 189,
193-94 (1997) (quoting Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d at 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1997)) (listing reasons that arbitrators will notbe partial to employers: the plaintiffs lawyer will
notice the bias and move for judicial review, a corrupt arbitrator will not survive in the
arbitration business and arbitrators do not care who pays them, as long as they get paid).
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however, whether the employee can ensure this may come down to bargaining
power.
The Court also did not address whether arbitration may be procedurally
inappropriate for employment disputes, because arbitrators tend to be white, male,
and affluent.38 Perhaps this issue did not need to be addressed because, until
recently, the federal judiciary was comprised of the same homogeneous
composition.39 However, juries tend to have more minorities and working class
people,40 which could be important for employees.
Of course, the Court had no obligation to address any of these issues because
it granted certiorari on the narrow issue of the meaning of the FAA section 1
exemption language. In reality, because an arbitration agreement is a contract,
most of these issues will be resolved in the actual agreement. However, because
of unequal bargaining power, the employee may have little influence over these
procedural matters.
Because of these unresolved issues, such as a lack of procedural fairness and
the absence of diversity of arbitrators, employees may have grounds to challenge
an arbitration agreement.4 ' Therefore, the Circuit City decision may have created
more grounds for challenging an arbitration agreement than it has eliminated.
B. The Ruling's Effect on Employers
1. Drawbacks for Employers
The Circuit City decision seemingly gives greater security to employers who
require their employees to sign arbitration agreements, so the decision may
encourage other employers to require these agreements.
42
Despite the apparent approval of requiring employees to agree to mandatory
binding arbitration of employment disputes, the decision may not prompt many
38 Charles Toutant, Workplace Arbitration Agreements Get a Charge out of Circuit City
but Limits of Their Effect in Employment Context Are Still Unclear, N.J. L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at
293 (referring to statement of Neil Mullin of Montclair office of Smith Mullin).
39 Kelly, supra note 31, at 52-53.
40 Toutant, supra note 38, at 293.
41 Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a
Viable Solution for Employers Seeking To Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1026 (1996) (stating that the arbitration
framework in Gilmer may have been procedurally deficient and warning employers to
anticipate litigation challenging these types of arbitration programs).
42 Holland & Hart, supra note 6, at 7.
[Vol. 17:1 20011
CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS
more employers to adopt such provisions4 3 One substantial drawback to
mandatory arbitration provisions is that they may create more work for the
employer. Employees who may be reluctant to file an actual lawsuit may be more
apt to pursue a claim in arbitration, which could mean that employers must
defend themselves against more claims.44 Also, employers may give up the
benefits of the substantial burden of proof that a plaintiff must satisfy in court
because arbitrators may not apply the burden of proof with the same stringency as
a federal judge.45 In addition, the number of issues left unresolved by the decision
may be an incentive for employers to forego adoption of these provisions.4 6
2. Benefits for Employers
The ruling does create some benefits for employers who have or will adopt
arbitration provisions, because there will not be parallel inconsistent decisions. 47
Prior to this decision, states had created their own rules to prohibit or limit the use
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment context.48 In addition,
states had civil rights laws affording employees a right to sue if they were
discriminated against. 9 Now these laws are defunct, because the FAA preempts
state laws hostile to arbitration of these claims.50
C. The Ruling's Effect on Employees
1. Preemption of State Law
While some have argued that the Circuit City ruling erases one of the few
remaining arguments an employee may wage against an employer when
43 See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 400-02 (2000)
(suggesting that mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims is not all that
beneficial for employers).
44 Lewton, supra note 41, at 1029-30.
45 Id. at 1030.
46 Id at 1031-32 (recognizing that Gilmer left so many issues unresolved that it may be
better for employers not to adopt mandatory arbitration provisions). Though in the context of
Gilmer, the argument still remains because of numerous unresolved issues.
47 Toutant, supra note 38, at 293.
48 Adrienne B. Koch, Mandating Arbitration After 'Circuit City, N.Y. L.J., June 7,2001,
at 1.
4 9 Savage, supra note 1, at 30 (stating that employers are clear to require arbitration of all
employment claims).
5 0 Anthony Michael Sabino, 'Circuit City' Marks Leap Forward for Arbitration, N.Y.
Li., Apr. 17,2001, at 9 (stating that the decision pre-empted California's civil rights laws).
225
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attempting to render an arbitration agreement unenforceable, 51 this argument does
not prove to be entirely true. Employees may be able to successfully challenge an
arbitration agreement on the grounds that it is unconscionable or invalid or that it
provides for a procedurally unfair arbitration proceeding.
While the ruling preempts state laws contrary to its holding that
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims is permissible even if agreement to
the provision is a condition of employment, the ruling does not preempt all
state laws. The mandatory arbitration contracts must still afford the employee
the full benefit of the law and cannot limit the substance of the employees'
rights. 52 State law challenges to the arbitration clauses may be brought under
specific state laws relating to the valid formation and construction of
contracts.53 Therefore, employees can attack an arbitration agreement if it is a
contract of adhesion or if it is unconscionable or otherwise invalid. 54 In
addition, as discussed above, the ruling leaves many procedural issues
unanswered that could be a means to challenge the arbitration agreement.
2. Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Employee advocates view this decision as a blow to the ideals that the Civil
Rights Act was enacted to achieve. Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA were
specially enacted to protect individuals from discrimination, especially in the
employment context.55 Therefore, it is arguable that employees who have claims
falling under these statutes should be subject to more protection than other
employees who bring non-statutory employment claims against their employer. 56
However, the Circuit City decision does not recognize this distinction.
51 Holland & Hart, supra note 6, at 7.
52 Discrimination Case Must Be Heard in Arbitration, Supreme Court Rules FAA Applies
to Employment Claims, 16 AIDS POL'Y & L., Apr. 13, 2001, at 1, 6 (statement made by Robert
Gregory, senior attorney, EEOC's Office of General Council).
53 CONSUMER FIN., supra note 30.
54 Ross Runkel, After Circuit City-Individual Employment Dispute Arbitration, LAB. &
EMP. NEWS (Labor and Employment Law Section, Ohio State Bar Association), Spring 2001, at
5,6.
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3. Contractual Nature ofArbitration
Although arbitration offers many benefits, 57 it is nonetheless a creature of
contract law.58 As such, it is controlled by the private sector, which could be
problematic for those who believe that the private sector has been the source of
racial and social inequity in the United States.59 Thus, it may be contrary to the
anti-discrimination statutes to require claims that arise under them to be subject to
binding arbitration.
4. Benefits for Employees
It is possible that the Circuit City ruling may actually benefit employees to
some extent. Many litigated employment disputes end in favor of the employer on
summary judgment, so arbitration may result in a better forum for employees who
have workplace disputes.60 In addition, arbitration's lower cost and quicker
resolution can benefit employees because a large company, through the discovery
phase of a trial, can "bleed an employee dry," rendering the employee unable to
pursue the claim.61
The Court's decision may not be as disastrous for employees as first
predicted. Although it may encourage more employers to adopt mandatory
arbitration provisions, employees will not necessarily fare worse in arbitration
than in litigation. In addition, the Court failed to address so many issues that an
employee may still be able to successfully challenge an arbitration provision in an
employment contract.
D. What the Ruling Might Change
Due to procedural deficiencies in arbitration and the lack of diversity or
training among arbitrators, it remains to be seen whether the Circuit City decision
57 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1313 (2001).
58 Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving & Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 779,793 (1992).
59 Halverson, supra note 55, at 488 (noting the historical perspective that the private sector
has been the source of racism in the United States, and the federal government has been the
savior).
60 US. Supreme Court Arbitration Act Covers Employment Contracts, Preempts State
Laws, PERSONNEL MANAGER'S LEGAL LETrER, June 2001, at 9, 11.
61 Toutant, supra note 38 (quoting Don Innamorato, partner at Princeton office of Reed
Smith). But see Marcia Coyle, 'Arbitration Heaven' Ahead, THE NAT'L L.J, Apr. 2, 2001, at
B3, (quoting Barry Cappello, employment attorney with Capello & McCann, Santa Barbara,
CA). However, arbitration in the employment context can be more expensive than going to
court. Ia
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will prompt a statutory change of the limited standards for judicial review of
arbitration62 to balance the decreased amount of procedural protection that the
statutory claimants will receive through arbitration.
63
The Circuit City decision may serve as an implied call to Congress to amend
the FAA to clearly delineate the FAA's intended coverage. In Gilmer, decided a
decade prior to Circuit City, the Court specifically did not interpret the section 1
language. The Gilmer decision provided an excellent opportunity for Congress to
clarify the statute because the Court made reference to the section 1 language,
though it did not base its holding on the language because the contract at issue
was not an employment contract. The Court waited a decade before attempting to
construe the section 1 language, during which time Congress failed to clarify the
language. This Congressional inaction may have prompted the Court to seize the
opportunity to interpret the language so as to prompt Congress to clarify the scope
of the FAA. Now that the Court has interpreted the language, it is Congress'
responsibility to amend the language or implicitly approve of the Court's
interpretation by inaction.
While it is impossible to know whether the Court used the Circuit City case
as an opportunity to prompt Congress to clarify the language in section 1, what is
clear is that the Circuit City decision has already garnered a congressional
response. House Bill 228264 has been introduced by Democrats in the House of
Representatives to amend the language in section I to clearly exclude all contracts
of employment from the coverage of the FAA. This bill would reverse the Court's
decision in Circuit City. A statutory reversal of the Circuit City decision would
have a more profound effect on the law than the decision itself because all of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals would have to cease holding that mandatory arbitration
provisions are lawful as they have been doing since Gilmer.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Circuit City may create more questions than it
answers. Many issues are left open after the decision, and it does not alter the
existing law, because lower courts have been enforcing mandatory arbitration
provisions in employment contracts since the 1991 Gilmer decision. Perhaps the
decision's greatest effect will be measured by congressional response that stems
from it.
Charity Robl
62 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) addresses the narrow grounds for appeal of arbitral awards.
63 Connolly & Scharman, supra note 34, at 2.
64 H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
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